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Abstract
This paper presents a life-cycle model of woman's labour supply, human capital formation and
savings for the evaluation of welfare-to-work and tax policies. Women's decisions are formalised in
a dynamic and uncertain environment. The model includes a detailed characterisation of the tax
system and of the dynamics of family formation while explicitly considering the determinants of
employment and education decisions: (i) contemporaneous incentives to work, (ii) future conse-
quences for employment through human capital accumulation and (iii) anticipatory e®ects on the
value of employment and education. The choice of parameters follows a careful calibration pro-
cedure, based of a large sample of data moments from the British population during the nineties
using BHPS data. Many important features established in the empirical literature are reproduced
in the simulation exercises, including the employment e®ects of the WFTC reform in the UK.
The model is used to gain further insight into the responses to two recent policy changes, the
October 1999 WFTC and the April 2003 WTC/CTC reforms. We ¯nd small but non-negligible
anticipation e®ects on employment and education.
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1 Introduction
In-work bene¯ts have gradually gained attention over the last 20 years. They have been introduced
in a number of countries, including the US, Canada, the UK and France, with increasing resources
being allocated to such schemes over time. At their core, in-work bene¯ts are a means of transferring
income towards low income families conditional on working. The schemes are generally designed as a
subsidy to working, frequently dependent on family composition, particularly the presence of children.
Commonly, the objective is to alleviate poverty whilst simultaneously mitigating some of the adverse
e®ects other bene¯ts have on the incentives to work.
In-work bene¯ts target unskilled workers and families with children. These two groups are
expected to face a comparatively high level of unemployment, with unemployment insurance and
redistributive instruments making up for the lack of earnings. Parents of young children are particu-
larly at risk of experiencing substantial costs of working: they may be entitled to especially generous
bene¯ts if on low income, may face high ¯xed costs of working in the form of childcare costs and may
value highly their o®-work time. They may also face very high marginal tax rates while working due
to rapid phasing-out of substantial bene¯ts (taper rates). If combined with high elasticities of labour
supply, the high taper rates may lead to substantial changes in how much the individuals are willing
to work and, in the limit, on whether they want to participate in the labour market at all.
Some empirical and theoretical studies have contributed to our understanding of the impacts
of in-work bene¯ts. Most of the attention has been on how they a®ect work incentives and labour
supply. In a seminal paper, Saez (2002) showed that the optimal design of in-work bene¯ts depends
on how responsive individuals are at the intensive (hours of work) and extensive (whether to work)
margins. Hotz and Scholz (2003) review the literature on the e®ects of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
the main US transfer scheme to the (working) poor. Card and Robins (2005) assess the e®ects of the
Canadian Self Su±ciency Project using experimental data, again on employment outcomes. For the
UK, Blundell and Hoynes (2004), Brewer et al. (2006) and Francesconi and van der Klauuw (2007)
assess the employment e®ects of the Working Families' Tax Credit reform of 1999. Most studies
2¯nd positive employment e®ects of in-work bene¯ts. Some more recent studies in a special issue
of the Economic Journal have looked at outcomes outside the labour market. Grogger and Karoly
(2009) review the experimental evidence in North America and study the e®ects of in-work bene¯ts
on marriage, divorce and fertility. Francesconi, Rainer and van der Klauuw (2009) study the e®ects
on a similar set of variables of welfare reforms in the UK. Gregg, Harkness and Smith (2009) focus
on lone parents and mental and health well-being of mothers as well as children outcomes, again for
the UK.
In this paper we aim to contribute to the understanding of the e®ects of welfare systems as a
whole and in-work bene¯ts in particular. In line with the latest literature, we acknowledge that the
generosity of in-work bene¯ts may a®ect life-cycle decisions other than employment. In particular, the
value of education may be a®ected by a contemporaneous increase in the value of the outside option
(being employed), the additional insurance mechanism that in-work bene¯ts may represent, and
the dynamic consequences of working and gaining experience on future employment and earnings.
We also realise that dynamic links may be of great importance in welfare evaluation. Responses
in anticipation of being (directly) a®ected by a policy in the future may accentuate its e®ects. For
example, education decisions may be responsive to expected changes in returns induced by alterations
to the policy environment. The insurance component of these schemes may also be substantial. It
may partially protect against bad income shocks, possibly encouraging individuals to remain in work
for longer and boosting labour market attachment.
We propose an evaluation model for policy analysis that accounts for how working incentives are
a®ected by transfer mechanisms: (i) the contemporaneous relative values of working and education,
(ii) the dynamic links in individual decisions, responsible for anticipatory and future changes in the
relative values of working and education, and (iii) the role of insurance. In a parallel paper we add
feedback e®ects to the analysis here.
Ours is a life-cycle model of education investment, labour supply and human capital formation.
Decisions are taken in a risky environment by risk-averse agents. We study female decisions as they
are most responsive to policy instruments given the natural course of life events a®ecting their cost
of working and returns from education. Crucial for them, we consider changes in family composition
taking place over the life-cycle, including partnering, separation and fertility. These occurrences may
have great consequences for the cost of working, labour market attachment and value of future work
and therefore, in retrospect, education investments. However, we do not address the consequences of
in-work bene¯ts on family formation. These are exogenously determined in our model.
3We apply our model to assess the impact of UK in-work bene¯ts and their reforms. In-work
(i.e. work-contingent) bene¯ts were ¯rst introduced in the UK in 1971 with the Family Income
Supplement. Several changes have occurred over time, with the scheme being re-labeled as Family
Credit in 1988 and Working Families' Tax Credit in 1999, and then split into the Child Tax Credit
and Working Tax Credit in 2003 (Child Tax Credit can be claimed by those not working). Generosity
has generally increased over time, with the value of awards increasing and eligibility extended to more
families, at least partly through reductions in the rate at which awards were tapered away. More
details of the UK tax system are given in Section 2.
The plan for the remainder of the paper after section 2 is as follows. Section 3 discusses
the model; section 4 describes the data used for estimation and calibration; section 5 discusses the
estimation and calibration procedures and describes the data and simulated moments for calibration
as well as the calibration results; section 6 presents further evidence on the empirical relevance of the
model; section 7 illustrates the use of the model for policy evaluation by an application to the 1999
WFTC and the 2002 WTC/CTC reforms of the in-work bene¯ts operating in the UK; and ¯nally
section 8 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The UK tax and transfer system
Although simpler than in many other OECD countries, the tax and transfer system in the UK is still
quite complex and involves a great number of instruments. To access the impact of tax credits within
a realistic environment, we explicitly account for the most important parts of the system. Here, we
brie°y describe the key personal taxes and transfer programs in the UK. More detail can be found in
Adam and Browne (2009), Adam, Browne, and Heady (2010) and Levell et al. (2009).1
There are three main personal taxes: income tax, employee national insurance and council tax.
Income tax is calculated at the individual level, though until relatively recently some parameters did
depend on family circumstances. Individuals each receive a tax{free allowance. Above that, marginal
tax rates are de¯ned over a small number of bands, generally two or three, with small changes over
time. In 2008 there were two bands with marginal tax rates of 20% and 40%. Employee National
Insurance is a payroll tax formally incident on employees (we ignore employer National Insurance,
which is the payroll tax formally incident on employers). Like income tax, it is de¯ned over a number
1The FORTAX microsimulation library is used to compute tax liability and bene¯t entitlement for each family. For
details on the implementation see Shephard (2009) and Shaw (2010).
4of bands; in 2008 there were three bands with marginal taxes of 0%, 11% and 1% respectively. The
self-employed face a slightly di®erent, and considerably more generous, National Insurance regime.
Council Tax is the only signi¯cant local tax in the UK. It was introduced in April 1993, replacing
the previous, and hugely unpopular, °at-rate `poll tax'. Unlike income tax and National Insurance,
council tax is levied at the household level. Tax liability varies by region and depends primarily on
the valuation band of the property occupied by the household.
The UK welfare/transfer system is assessed primarily at a family level and depends on income
and assets as well as family composition and needs. In addition to tax credits, we consider four other
bene¯ts: income support/income-based jobseeker's allowance, housing bene¯t, council tax bene¯t
and child bene¯t.
Income support and income-based jobseeker's allowance are means-tested bene¯ts that top
family income up to a speci¯ed level based on family needs. They are basically the same bene¯t,
except for additional job search requirements in the latter. Neither bene¯t can claimed by those in
full time work: income support is for those not in a position to work (e.g. lone parents with young
children, carers and the disabled), while jobseeker's allowance is for people actively searching for
work. We ignore contribution-based jobseeker's allowance, which is a non-means-tested subsidy paid
to unemployed job-seekers who meet certain contribution conditions. It is only available for up to six
months, after which claimants move onto income-based jobseeker's allowance.
Housing bene¯t and council tax bene¯t are means-tested rebates to cover rent and council tax.
They vary substantially with local conditions (e.g. local rents in the case of housing bene¯t) and
family composition. They are tapered away at high rates: 65% for housing bene¯t and 20% for
council tax bene¯t.
Child bene¯t is a °at rate bene¯t that varies by number of dependent children and their age.
It is not means-tested.
There are currently two main tax credits: working tax credit and child tax credit. Working tax
credit (WTC) is an employment subsidy for low-wage workers designed to improve work incentives
by increasing after-tax earnings. To be eligible, an hours condition needs to be satis¯ed: in families
with children, at least one adult must work 16 hours or more; in families without children, at least
one adult must work 30 or more hours a week and be aged 25 or over. WTC also includes a subsidy
for formal childcare, available so long as all adults in the family work 16 hours or more a week.
5Child tax credit (CTC) is the main source of means-tested support for families with children.
Awards depend on family composition and there are no employment conditions that have to be met.
WTC and CTC are subject to a joint means test operating at the family level. The main taper rate
is currently 39%.
WTC and CTC were introduced in April 2003, replacing working families' tax credit (WFTC)
as well as some other support available through the transfer system. WFTC had been introduced in
October 1999 as a more generous (but otherwise similar) version of the Family Credit programme
(FC). The WFTC and WTC/CTC reforms both increased generosity for existing claimants as well
as extending entitlement further up the income distribution. Moreover, while the WFTC was only
targeted at families with children and demanded at least one of the adults to be working, WTC/CTC
extended eligibility to families without children (through the WTC, if working above 30 hours per
week) and to low-income families with children independently of their working status (through CTC).
Table 1 brie°y summarises the main tax credit parameters for a couple or lone parent with 1
child in April 1999, 2002 and 2004, illustrating the FC, WFTC and WTC/CTC regimes. Figure 1
illustrates how these changes act to shift the budget constraint, plotting the example of a lone parent
(with a child aged four) who earns $4.6 per hour, does not rent her accommodation and does not
use formal paid-for childcare. The e®ect of both reforms was to shift the budget constraint upwards.
The gradient also increases following the WFTC reform (because the tax credit withdrawal rate was
reduced).
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Notes: Per week values. Tax credit awards and budget constraints for a lone
parent of a child aged 4 not renting her accommodation and not having formal
childcare costs. Female earns $4.6 per hour. Fortax simulations.
6Table 1: Tax credit award: couple or lone parent with 1 child
April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
(FC) (WFTC) (WTC/CTC)
Basic award $64.95 $88.95 $131.82
30-hour premium $11.05 $11.65 $12.31
Earnings threshold $80.65 $94.50 $97.31 and $961.54
Taper rate 70% 55% 37% and 6.67%
(net earnings) (net earnings) (gross earnings)
Help with childcare Disregard up to $60 Max award increased Max award increased
of childcare expenses by 70% of childcare by 70% of childcare
from income expenses up to $135 expenses up to $135
Notes: All values are on a per-week basis. Families with children are eligible if at least one adult works 16 or more
hours per week. Help with childcare requires all adults to work more than 16 hours per week. The increase in generosity
between WFTC and WTC/CTC is exaggerated because the reform also incorporated elements of other bene¯ts.
3 The model
This section presents and discusses the life-cycle model of female education, employment and savings
used to assess the e®ects of tax credits on education investments, working, income distribution and,
ultimately, well-being.
3.1 Overview of the model
The life-cycle of females is split into three stages corresponding to education, working and retirement,
all mutually exclusive activities. The decision process is modeled from the age of 17 for risk averse
individuals in an uncertain environment.
Education investments are settled at the age of 17. We consider three education levels: basic,
secondary and university education. We assume the individual does not bear the direct monetary
cost of secondary education but pays fees for university education. Moreover, university education
carries indirect costs in terms of foregone earnings with a delayed entrance in the labour market.
7Upon completion of education, the woman moves into working life. This is an absorbing state,
meaning that returning to education is ruled-out. In each period of her working life, the woman
decides on how much to work and consume. We allow for three levels of labour supply, corresponding
to unemployment, part and full time employment, respectively 0, 20 and 40 hours of work per week. A
by-product of working is human capital, accumulated through learning-by-doing while employed and
eroded while unemployed. Realised hourly earnings depend on education attainment, accumulated
human capital and idiosyncratic persistent productivity shocks, interpreted as health shocks.
Finally, retirement arrives deterministically at the age of 60 and is also an absorbing state.
To face reduced income after retirement, women accummulate savings during their working life. For
simplicity it is assumed that individuals live for another 10 years after retirement.
We model education, employment and savings decisions to be optimal from an inter-temporal
perspective. The decision process is determined by contemporaneous costs and restrictions, as well as
contemporaneous and long-lasting uncertain returns. It is embedded in a rich context characterised
by the institutional environment and the dynamics of family composition.
The discussion of family composition e®ects is generally absent from studies of men behaviour
in the education and labour markets. In contrast, family-related considerations are empirically most
relevant in the case of women. Crucial to our analysis, the e®ects of transfer systems will not
be independent from the process of family formation and how it determines the value of human
capital and working. We therefore explicitly model the dynamics of family composition, allowing for
partnering, separation and the arrival of a child. For simplicity, variation in family composition is
assumed exogenous to the decision process. The consideration of endogenous family formation and
how it is a®ected by institutional features is outside the scope of this study.
Both women and their potential partners are heterogeneous with respect to a number of char-
acteristics. These can be observable or unobservable to third parties, including the policy maker.
Observable heterogeneity include ages, education, working experience, employment status, savings
(pooled in couples) and family composition variables. Unobserved heterogeneity includes idiosyn-
cratic productivity levels and preferences for working and education, considered unveri¯able by third
parties.
We consider two forms of income uncertainty, both a®ecting the returns from human capital
investments. One is linked to the stochastic process of family composition and partner earnings.
The other is the persistent but unpredictable productivity process capturing, say, health status. It is
8directly transmitted into earnings and may lead to job loss. As result, investments in education and
human capital are inherently risky. The tax and bene¯t system may a®ect their return and dispersion
in di®erent ways over the course of life, thus potentially changing the incentives to study and work
over the whole life.
The chances of future adversity generate precautionary behaviour and a demand for insurance.
However, imperfect observability of individual characteristics will lead to incompleteness in insurance
markets. Policy instruments such as unemployment bene¯ts or wage subsidies may provide partial
insurance against income variation, while savings and human capital accumulation are forms of self-
insurance that the individual may exploit.
There are several dynamic elements in the model. First, the life-long process of human capital
formation depends of education investment at the start of life and working decisions throughout
adulthood. Education equips the individual with new, di®erent skills, with life-long consequences for
the type of human capital she supplies. Working also entails investment in human capital through the
accumulation of experience. The returns to human capital investments are secured in future working
spells. Second, savings allow for a smooth consumption path and insure against periods of adversity
or when working is overly costly. And third, family composition changes over the course of working
life, with the possibility of marriage, divorce and child-bearing.
We consider the presence of credit constraints during the female's working life. Not only may
credit constraints directly a®ect employment in the face of very high costs of working, they may
retrospectively feed under-investments in education if the investment changes (increases) the odds of
being constrained in the future. Public interventions may reduce the incidence of binding constraints
by transferring resources across periods of life.
A ¯nal major feature of our model is the explicit inclusion of a complex transfer system re-
sembling those typical of developed countries. Two major components of these systems are: (i)
progressive tax rates, and (ii) generous means-tested bene¯ts tapered away as income increases. To-
gether, these two sets of policy instruments may signi¯cantly a®ect disposable income at di®erent
stages of the life-cycle, the returns from human capital investment and exposure to income risk. Thus,
they are not fully understood without a detailed description of the individual decision process. More-
over, their e®ects depend on how they interact with other policy instruments in changing working
and education incentives and in what margins of the distribution of workers.
For the empirical application, we reproduce the UK personal tax and bene¯ts system of the
91990s and 2000s, including the exact schedule of income taxes, social security contributions and local
taxes, unemployment insurance, income support, housing and council tax bene¯ts, child and childcare
bane¯ts as well as tax credits. We study how major changes in the tax schedule may a®ect women's
incentives to invest in education and work over the life-cycle.
We now formally detail the elements of the model.
3.2 State Space
We split the state space faced by woman i aged a at time t into three parts, (Xiat;­iat;¦t). X
contains the observed idiosyncratic information, including woman's education, experience and pre-
vious activity, marital status and the characteristics of a present partner (his education, experience
and previous employment status), whether a child is living in the family and her age, and family
savings. ­ contains the unobserved idiosyncratic information, including the woman's and man's (if
present) productivity levels and preferences for working. ¦t details information on aggregate prices
and transfer mechanisms at time t, including market wage rates, childcare costs, the risk-free interest
rate and current design of the tax and bene¯t system.
In all that follows, we use the superscripts
¡
m;k ¢
to denote the man's and child's information,
respectively. Variables without a superscript represent either female or family information. With no
loss of generality, we focus the discussion on one generation, making a and t equivalent in terms of
information. We therefore omit the index t to ease notation. Capital letters are reserved to denote
prices, individual observable characteristics are represented by small letters. Greek letters are used to
represent unobserved information and model parameters. Functions are represented by both capital
and small letters.
3.3 Family composition
Family composition varies exogenously over time. Two types of changes may occur: (i) arrival or
departure of a (dependent) child; and (ii) arrival or departure of a partner.
We discuss the former ¯rst. For simplicity, we cap the maximum number of children to one per
family at each moment in time. The probability of a child leaving is modeled as dependent on the
age of the child only: it is zero for a child younger than 18 and jumps to one when the child turns
1018 years old. The arrival rate of newborns is positive only in childless families. It is modeled as a































are dummy variables representing the presence (if equal 1) or absence (if equal 0) of
a child and partner, respectively, a and s are the female age and education, respectively, and ak is
age of the child.
The age of the child, ak, evolves deterministically:
ak
ia = ak
ia¡1 + 1: (3)
The man's problem is viewed from the woman's perspective and thus partly depends on her
characteristics. He is characterised by three features: educational attainment, sm, employment status,
lm, and employment earnings wm. The odds of a woman ¯nding a man (sm;lm;wm) depends her



































where the ¯rst term after the equality represents the probability of drawing a man with education sm
for a single woman with characteristics X, the second term represents the probability that this man
is working and the third term is the distribution (density) of his productivity level.
We now specify the arrival and departure probabilities of a male of type sm and postpone the
discussion of male labour supply and earnings to the next two subsections. With respect to the arrival






































113.4 Men's employment and earnings in new couples
Present men are either in full time employment or unemployed. This is consistent with empirical
evidence showing men labour supply adjustments occur primarily on the extensive margin. We
model fulltime employment to correspond to 40 hours of work per week, and unemployment to be 0
hours of work per week.
The employment status (lm) and earnings (wm) of a newly-wed man depend on the character-
istics of his spouse, an implied outcome from sorting in marriage market that we leave unspeci¯ed in
this study. We assume that, conditional on his education, only the woman's age remains correlated
















sm ln(a) + Àm
smia (7)
where (ºm;H0) are the unexplained and explained parts of the man's working selection process,
respectively, Wm
sm is the market wage for men of education sm, ®m
sm measures the returns to experience
to men of education sm, and Àm
sm is his idiosyncratic productivity level, with a distribution that again
depends on sm.
3.5 Men's employment and earnings in ongoing couples
In ongoing couples, men's employment and earnings are formalised in much the same way as for new
couples. However, the reduced form selection model now allows for persistence in employment status






























As before, (ºm;H1) represent the unexplained and explained part of the working decision, respectively,
where the latter is now a function of previous employment status. Unobserved productivity, Àm
sm,
follows a random walk process with innovation "m
sm, assumed serially uncorrelated and iid within
education groups, but its distribution may depend on sm.
123.6 Women's earnings
Women's earnings follow a dynamic process similar to that of men. However, working experience is
endogenously considered:
lnwia = lnWs + ®s ln(eia + 1) + Àsia
Àsia = Àsia¡1 + "sia
(9)
where w is earnings, a function of the market wage rate for her educational level, Ws, accumulated
experience, e, and idiosyncratic unobserved productivity, À. Unobserved productivity is a random
walk with an iid innovation ". The distributions of both À and " are education-speci¯c.
3.7 Women's inter-temporal decision problem during working life
At any point a in her working life, the woman chooses the optimal level of consumptionn and labour
supply depending on the state of her world as characterised by (Xia;­ia;¦). The decision involves the
consideration of the present costs and bene¯ts of her actions as well as potential future consequences.














where V is the optimum expected value of present and future discounted utility, ¯ is the discount
rate and U is the per-period °ow of utility, a function of current family consumption (c), woman's
labour supply (l) and the state space. In the optimisation problem, c is a continuous decision variable
while l may assume three di®erent alternative values, 0, 20 and 40 for the number of working hours
per week if the woman is unemployed, in part-time or in full-time employment, respectively.


















where n represents equivalised family dimension, ¹ is the risk aversion (or inter-temporal substitution)
parameter, and µ is the woman's taste type or her permanent preferences for each level of labour
supply. The function e U is the utility shifter by family composition and employment status.
Optimisation is subject to a number of restrictions including the budget constraint, the dynam-
ics of the state space and the initial and terminal conditions. We now describe each of them.
13The budget constraint follows the typical dynamic form,
kia+1 = Rtkia + yia ¡ cia (12)
where k represents accumulated assets, R is the risk-free interest rate and y is net family income.
Families are assumed to be credit constrained. How severe the constraint is depends on the education
decision of the woman. Individuals deciding to invest in education are entitled to a loan aimed at
covering their university fees and (some) living expenses througout their extended student life. Others
not investing are not entitled to this higher borrowing limit. In addition, borrowing is only allowed
if it can be fully repaid before the end of the woman's working life. Thus,
kia+1 > k(si):
Family income is determined by the woman's and man's employment status and earnings to-
gether with current taxes and bene¯ts. An important source of working costs are related with childcare
on families with children. We assume that young children need childcare from either their parents or
a third party. We explicitly consider the existence of childcare costs incurred by working mothers of
children younger than 5 or full-time working mothers of children aged 5 to 10. Thus, family income
can be formally described as follows,



























where y is net family income. liawia and dm
a [lm
iawm
ia] are working earnings for the woman and partner
where present, respectively. The woman's earnings process is de¯ned in equation (9). The man's
working income is determined by the selection model (6)-(7) for newly matched men or (8) for men
in on-going couples. T is the family's tax liability (net of bene¯ts), which is designed to reproduce
closely the UK's transfer system, and Ck is childcare costs, the total being proportional to the woman's
working hours depending on the child's age and presence and working status of a partner.
While employed, the woman accumulates experience depending on hours worked. The rule of
experience accumulation is,
eia+1 = eia (1 ¡ ¸D) + 1(lia = F) + ¸P1(lia = P) (13)
where ¸P is the fraction of experience accumulation if in part-time as opposed to full-time employment,
and ¸D is the depreciation rate.
14The optimisation problem is also subject to the dynamics of family formation as described in
equations (1), (2), (4) and (5).
Finally, the terminal condition is
ki;70 ¸ 0
where 70 is the age 10 years after retirement, representing the end of life for purposes of savings
decisions. Initial conditions are speci¯ed below together with the educational decisions.
3.8 Women's education
We consider three levels of education, basic (s = 1), secondary (s = 2) and university (s = 3). These
correspond to leaving school after GCSEs at age 16, after A-levels at 18 and after a degree at 21.
Before entering adult, independent life at the age of 19, the woman decides about her education take
up. If opting for basic or secondary education, she will enter the labour market immediatly, aged
19. If deciding to continue in education and acquire an university degree, she will postpone entering
the labour market for another 3 years, until she reaches 22 years of age and have completed her
degree. Working life is an absorbing state, meaning that we exclude the possibility of returning to
education once this state is left. We denote by as the age at which the woman enters the labour
market depending on education attainment, s.
Education decisions depend on the information available to the young woman. It includes her
initial level of assets, k, and her permanent preferences for working and studying, µ, her preferences
for each education level, $s, as well as all institutional features and prices, including fees and possible
loans. She makes her education choice having only partial information about her returns from the
investment: she knows her productivity in each type of skill up to her preferences for working only,
µ. Precise information on her initial productivity level is revealed only once she enters the labour
market, at 19 or 22 depending on education investment.
Designate by Vs the expected value of education s. It is formalised as a function of the discounted
value of lifetime utility at the beginning of adult life, age 19, and a idiosyncratic preference shocks:
Vsi (ki19;µi;$si) = E[Vi19 (Xi19;­i19;¦)jsi] + $si
For the two lowest education levels, s = 1;2, the initial value function at 19 is recursively
15de¯ned as
Vi19 (Xi19;­i19;¦jsi) = max
ci19;li19
fU (ci19;li19;Xi19;­i19) + ¯E[Vi20 jXi19;­i19;¦]g (14)








Àsi19 correlated with µ
The state space evolves as de¯ned in the previous section. In particular, family composition at age
19 depends on the exogenous probabilities described before, a function of female age and education
when previously (at age 18) childless and single.
For university graduates, s = 3, time in education extends to 3 more years delaying working
life till the age of 22. Only then will other work- and family-related information be revealed. Before
moving into the working life, the woman remains single and childless. The initial value function at
19 can be recursively de¯ned as






¯a¡19U (cia;lia = S;Xia;­ia) + ¯22¡19E[Vi22 jXi21;­i21;¦]
¾
(15)
subject to the conditions
ki19 given







for a = 19;20;21 and where the contemporaneous utility for a student is as de¯ned generically in
(11),



















16It is assumed that full-time education requires a similar e®ort to fulltime employment and thus we
simplify µ(S) = µ(FTE) where S and FTE stand for education and full-time employment, respec-
tively.
The continuation value at age 22 for university graduates is de¯ned recursively as in (14):
Vi22 (Xi22;­i22;¦jsi = 3) = max
ci22;li22
fU (ci22;li22;Xi22;­i22) + ¯E[Vi23 jXi22;­i22;¦]g (16)
where the initial conditions are






Àsi22 correlated with µ
T is the university fee for a three years degree and other variables are as de¯ned in the previous
section.





Our empirical analysis is supported by the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is the main
UK household panel survey, by now comprising 17 annual waves covering the period from 1991 to
2007. It started with 5,500 households in 1991 and, except for panel attrition, all of these have been
followed for the duration of the survey. Other individuals have been added to the sample along the
way | sometimes temporarily | as they formed families with original interviewees or were born to
them. Additional low-income and regional booster samples have also been created. From 2009, the
BHPS forms part of the new and much larger `Understanding Society' survey.
Interviews are conducted with all individuals in a sampled household who are aged 16 or over.
Most ¯eldwork is conducted in the autumn and early winter. A great deal of information is collected
17on demographic characteristics, educational achievement, employment, income and bene¯ts, and some
expenditures, particularly those with childcare. Information on assets is only collected once every 5
years.
Our full dataset is an unbalanced panel of around 4,400 women aged between 19 and 50 and
observed over at least two consecutive periods during the years 1991 to 2006. 10% of these women are
observed over the whole period, 60% in no more than 6 consecutive waves, 24% are observed entering
the working life from education.
However, only the ¯rst 8 BHPS waves are used in the estimation and calibration procedures.
These data cover the years between 1991 to 1998, a relatively stable period in terms of policy en-
vironment preceding the major 1999 reform in tax credits that we will be studying in the empirical
application. Using the model ¯t to the pre-WFTC reform, we can then validate its speci¯cation by
contrasting its predicted e®ect of the WFTC reform with available reduced form estimates based on
data drawn after the reform.
The 8-waves working data contain observations for over 2,100 women aged between 19 and 50
and observed for at least two consecutive periods. Almost 40% of these women are observed over the
8 waves and 20% are observed entering the working life from education. Information on real earnings
among working women has been de-trended as this period witnessed a systematic raise in real wages.
5 Estimation and calibration
We follow a multi-step strategy to identify the parameters of the model. The exogenous parts of the
model, including the dynamics in family composition and the partner's labour supply and earnings,
are estimated outside the structural model, in a reduced form framework. Details can be found in
appendix A. Two parameters are calibrated using values suggested in the empirical literature: the risk
aversion coe±cient, ¹, set to -0.56, and the discount factor, ¯, set to 0.98. Moreover, the interest rate,
R, is set to 1.015, tuition cost of university education amounts to GBP 3,000 over three years and the
credit limit for university students (and graduates throughout their life) is GBP 5,000, re°ecting the
university education policy of the late nineties in the UK. For everyone else, credit is constrained.
All other structural parameters in the woman's labour supply and earnings processes are cal-
ibrated using a set of data moments and their counterpart in simulated data. The production of
18simulated data uses the model solution together with the initial distribution of assets for individuals
aged 17 as observed in the data; the life-cycle pro¯le of each individual is drawn 10 times. A weighting
scheme is used to estimate the data moments in order to make all ages equally represented and match
the distribution of age in simulated data. Otherwise, the estimation procedures applied to real and
simulated data are identical. More detail on calibration moments and derived parameters is given
below, keeping notation as close as possible to that used in the structural model (as before, the index
t is omitted).2
Preferences for working Women's preferences for working depend on her family status and id-
iosyncratic unobservable characteristics. The latter is assumed to follow a discrete, two point distribu-
tion a®ecting the utility of working. The former is accounted for by family-speci¯c utility parameters.
Both the former and the latter are included as shifters to the marginal utility of equivalised (by family
size) consumption. Both allow for di®erential e®ects by total labour supply, depending on whether it
amounts to full- or part-time employment.
Identi¯cation of the parameters determining preferences for working relies mainly on a set of
moments describing labour supply by family status and labour market transitions by past produc-
tivity. Tables 2 and 3 display the calibrated parameters and the match between data and simulated
moments, respectively.
The parameters in rows (1)-(5), column (1) of table 2 represent the relative preference for full-
time work among women in families of the speci¯ed type as compared to the baseline of childless
women (rows (1) to (3)) or single women (rows (4) and (5)). As for all other parameters in this
table, negative values signify a comparative positive preference towards full-time employment while
positive values signify stronger distaste. Under the present parameterisation, mothers ¯nd it more
costly to take up full-time work, particularly if the child is under 2 years of age. On the contrary,
the presence of a partner, notably of a working partner, alleviates the utility cost of full-time work.
The corresponding parameters for part-time employment are displayed in column (2) and should be
interpreted as increments over the parameters in column (1). Rows (1)-(3) establish that mothers of
dependent children have a smaller distaste for part-time than for full-time employment, but still larger
than that of childless women. Likewise, women in couples have a stronger preference for full-time
than for part-time work, and more so than single women.
2The choice of moments for calibration is is in the spirit of indirect inference, although here we do not use formal
numerical procedures to ¯nd the optimum set of parameters (see Smith, 1990, Gourieroux, Monfort and Renaul, 1993
and Gallant and Tauchen, 1996, dor detail on indirect inference).





(1) Mother of dependent child 0.08 -0.01
(2) Mother of child aged 0-2 0.04 -0.02
(3) Mother of child aged 3-5 0.00 -0.01
(4) Woman in couple -0.06 0.024
(5) Woman in couple, partner working -0.14 0.064
Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences
(6) type 1: µ = 1 0.30 0.13
(7) type 2: µ = 2 0.53 0.23
(8) % type 1 in population 0.657
Notes: For a negative coe±cient of risk aversion ¹ in 11, as is the case in the present
parametrisation, negative (positive) preference parameters indicate relative like (dis-
like) for the respective type of work. Parameters in each row are as follows. Columns
(1) to (5): shifters in marginal utility of consumption by family characteristics, de¯n-
ing function U in equation (11); parameters under `part-time' are increments with
respect to `full-time'. Columns (6) to (8): distribution of discrete, two-point distri-
bution of preferences for work full-time or part-time respectively.
Rows (6)-(8) in the same table display the distribution of unobserved preferences towards
work, speci¯ed as a bivariate distribution. Both groups exhibit relative distaste towards working as
compared to leisure, the distaste being more pronounced among type 2 women (µ = 2) representing
about 1/3 of the overall population.
Among the set of identi¯cation moments, those more closely a®ected by these preference param-
eters are displayed in table 3 (even though other moments will also determine the choice of preference
parameters, notably the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and its link to earnings). Rows
(1) to (6) show the correspondence between data and simulated participation rates among women in
di®erent types of family; rows (7) to (9) show the correspondence of transition rates. In all cases,
data and simulated moments are very close.
20Table 3: Labour supply by family composition: data and simulated moments
data moments simulation moments
all work part-time all work part-time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment rates by family composition
(1) all 0.74 0.22 0.75 0.20
(2) mothers 0.61 0.39 0.60 0.39
(3) mothers of children aged 0-2 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
(4) mothers of children aged 3-5 0.53 0.47 0.51 0.48
(5) women in couples 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.24
(6) women in couples, partner working 0.78 0.26 0.79 0.25
Transition rates
(7) U to E 0.19 0.16
(8) E to U 0.06 0.05
(9) E to U: earnings below q10 0.15 0.13
(10) E to U: earnings below q50 0.09 0.09
(11) E to U: earnings below q90 0.06 0.06
Notes: Moments in rows (1) to (6) are employment rates over all the population (columns (1) and (3)) or part-time
employment rates among employed (columns (2) and (4)). Moments in rows (7) to (11) are transition rates to (row
(6)) and from (other rows) employment. `U' stands for unemployment. `E' stands for total employment, including
part-time and full-time. q10, q50 and q90 are the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the distribution of observed
earnings in the data, respectively.
Earnings: level and dynamics Women's earnings follow a random walk process with an id-
iosyncratic, education-speci¯c initial value and a drift depending on accumulated experience. Our
identi¯cation procedure uses two sets of simple regression models. The ¯rst describes the relationship
between the growth rate in earnings and that of accumulated experience over the life-cycle, as well
as its dispersion. The second describes earnings levels and dispersion among young adults joining
the work force from education life. In addition, quantiles of the distribution of earnings at entrance
in the labour market are used to pin down the distribution of productivity at entrance conditional
on type (as described by working preferences, µ). The dynamics of human capital, underlying the
dynamics of earnings, is more loosely identi¯ed from the pro¯le of earnings with age. In all cases,
moments are estimated/simulated by education level where, again, three levels are considered, basic,
secondary and university. Tables 4 and 5 display the parameters' values and match between data and
21simulated moments, respectively. Graph 2 illustrates the match between data an simulated earnings
pro¯les among working women.




(1) hourly wage rates (GBP, Jan05 prices) 4.15 4.60 5.40
(2) returns to human capital (experience) 0.11 0.14 0.22
(3) mean productivity at entrance, type 1 0.01 0.06 0.23
(4) st. error productivity at entrance 0.32 0.33 0.43
(5) st. error innovation in productivity 0.13 0.14 0.12
(6) human capital accumulation while in PT work 0.30 0.30 0.00
(7) human capital depreciation rate 0.00 0.04 0.07
Notes: Parameters in each row are as follows (for s = 1;2;3 corresponding to basic, secondary and
university education, respectively). Column (1): Ws as in equation (9). Column (2): ®s in equation
(9). Columns (3) and (4): E (Àasjs;µ = 1) and
p
var(Àasjs) (see initial conditions under equations
(14) or (16)) where as is the age of entrance in the labour market for an individual with education s
and µ describes unobserved preferences for working (its distribution being described in table 2); À is
assumed to follow a mixed normal distribution. Column (5):
p
var(Àasjs) in equation (9). Columns
(6) and (7): ¸Ps and ¸Us in equation (13); PT stands for `part-time work'.
The earnings-related parameters in table 4 show some familiar features. As compared to lower
levels, university education carries a substantial wage premium (17% and 30% as compared to sec-
ondary and basic education, respectively; see row (1)), much more signi¯cant returns to experience
(row (2)), and a process of human capital accumulation that depends more heavily on (long) working
hours (row (6)) and is exposed to faster depreciation (row (7)). Moreover, mean di®erences in pro-
ductivity by (unobserved) preferences for work (row (3)) and conditional (on preferences for work)
dispersion in productivity (row (4)) are larger for university education than for lower education levels.
The di®erences between basic and secondary education are not as pronounced and in the expected
directions.
The analysis of moments in table 5 reveals again that simulations closely reproduce the patterns
observed in data.3 Figure 2 also shows a strong match between data and simulated earnings pro¯les
3The data dispersion parameters in rows (2) and (6), columns (1)-(3), are net of measurement error, formalised in
the classic form.
22Table 5: Earnings regressions: data and simulated moments
data moments simulation moments
by education by education
low medium high low medium high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Earnings among young workers entering WL
(1) Level 1.49 1.60 1.88 1.48 1.59 1.87
(2) Dispersion (se) 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.41
(3) % below q25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25
(4) % below q75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.80
Earnings growth among workers aged 50 or less
(5) Experience 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.21 0.27
(6) Dispersion (se) 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.12
Notes: Parameters in rows (1) to (4) derived from observed (columns (1) to (3)) and simulated
(columns (4) to (6)) earnings among workers during ¯rst working life period, immediately
after leaving education. The dispersion parameters in row (2), columns (1) to (3), are net
of classical measurement error in earnings. The parameters in rows (3) and (4) represent
the proportion of working young women earning below the 25th and 75th percentiles of the
(data) their observed distribution of earnings. Parameters in rows (5) and (6) derived from
observed (columns (1) to (3)) and simulated (columns (4) to (6)) ¯rst di®erences in earnings
among continuously employed women under the age of 50. Again, the dispersion parameters
in row (6), columns (1) to (3), are net of classical measurement error in earnings.
among workers by education attainment.
Education The choice of education occurs at the beginning of life, before entrance in the working
life. Selection is determined by the relative expected value and costs associated with each education
level. In addition to the monetary and utility cost of education, present for university investment in
the form of fees, foregone earnings and (dis)taste for full-time work that a®ects students as full-time
workers alike, the relative preferences for secondary and university education are also determined by a
pair of idiosyncratic shocks, ($s=2;$s=3) in equations (14) and (15). It is assumed that ($s=2;$s=3)
are independent, normally distributed random variables of variance 1. Their expected value is deter-
mined by the distribution of education attainment.
The ¯gures in rows (1) and (2) of table 6 show a good match between data and simulations in
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age
sim: educ=1 data: educ=1
sim: educ=2 data: educ=2
sim: educ=3 data: educ=3
By education
Notes: Mean log earnings among working women by education attainment
and age. In the legend, `sim' stands for simulated data, `data' stands for real
data, `educ=1' (or 2,3) represents basic, secondary and university education
levels.





(1) real data 0.38 0.45 0.17
(2) simulated data 0.37 0.45 0.18
Parameters: distribution of $
(3) mean 0.32 1.05
Notes: Moments in row (1) are estimated on real data and repre-
sent the distribution of education among individuals leaving educa-
tion during the observation window. Moments in row (2) represent
similar moments based on simulated data. Parameters in row (3) are
the centre of the distributions of taste preferences for secondary and
university education.
24terms of education take-up. They are partly driven by the distribution of idiosyncratic preferences
for education determined by the parameters in row (3). The positive (and increasing with education
level) expected values of $ establish a positive taste for education. However, such preference is to be
cumulated with the relative distaste for working, which applies also during studying years. Overall,
these parameters attenuate the utility cost of education as compared to employment.
6 Model ¯t and validation
The ¯gures in the previous section show a close correspondence between data and simulated moments
used in calibration. In this section we look at empirical patterns outside the calibration set, and at how
the model fares in trying to reproduce some important results established in the empirical literature.
The construction of simulated data for this exercise follows a similar procedure to that described
in section 5. The observed distribution of assets at the age of 17 is used to initialise simulations; ten
full life cycle pro¯les are simulated for each individual observation. There are 562 observations of
assets for 17 year olds in the BHPS being used as initial conditions. Most of the results discussed
below are based on simulated data under the April 1999 policy regime, pre Working Families Tax
Credit (WFTC) reform. Some parameters, like the e®ects of the 1999 WFTC reform presented in
subsection 6.3, also demand the use of simulations under a policy regime operating after October
1999, after the WFTC reform. We use the policy regime operating in April 2002 for comparability
with the empirical literature. When unexpected changes in the environment are required to produce
some parameters, like the elasticities in subsection 6.2 or the WFTC e®ects in subsection 6.3, these are
introduced as if unannounced at randomly drawn ages during the working life. Education responses
are excluded in all case.
6.1 Employment
The life-cycle pro¯le of employment rates are displayed in ¯gures 3 and 4.
Figure 3 con¯rms the well known fact that employment rates increase with education. It also
reveals that employment pro¯les are U-shaped irrespective of education, although the dip occurs
earlier and is more pronounced for lower levels of education. This pro¯le re°ects the impact of child
bearing on labour supply, especially during the child's early years, and the lower labour market
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By education
Notes: In the legend, `sim' stands for simulated data, `data' stands for real
data, `educ=1' (or 2,3) represents basic, secondary and university education
levels.
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sim: mother data: mother
By presence of dependent child
Notes: In the legend, `sim' stands for simulated data and `data' stands for real data.
attachment among lower-educated women. There are several features of the model that formalise the
higher labour market attachment of more educated women (in addition to higher wage rates). These
include higher returns to experience, higher human capital depreciation rates, and a distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity leading to a disproportionately high representation of high-productivity
26and low-distaste-for-working individuals among more educated women. These factors create simulated
pro¯les that closely resemble those from data.
The e®ects of family composition are displayed in ¯gure 4. Marital status seems to have only
mild e®ects of employment probabilities, and this is re°ected in the simulated pro¯les. In contrast,
the impact of a dependent child on labour supply is very signi¯cant and decreasing with woman's age
as the average age of children increases. In the absence of a dependent child, labour supply remains
constant with women's age. Both these features are reproduced in the simulations.
Table 7: Employment rates: part-time, full-time and all employment; data and simulated moments
data moments simulation moments
part-time full-time all part-time full-time all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
By education
(1) basic 0.19 0.49 0.67 0.19 0.45 0.65
(2) secondary 0.14 0.67 0.81 0.15 0.63 0.78
(3) university 0.09 0.78 0.88 0.05 0.83 0.88
By marital status
(4) single 0.09 0.64 0.73 0.10 0.65 0.75
(5) in couple 0.19 0.55 0.74 0.19 0.55 0.75
By presence of child
(6) no child 0.08 0.80 0.88 0.08 0.78 0.87
(7) dependent child 0.24 0.37 0.61 0.24 0.36 0.60
(8) all 0.16 0.57 0.74 0.15 0.59 0.75
Table 7 decomposes employment rates by working hours interacted with education level (rows
(1) to (3)), marital status (row (4) and (5)) and presence of dependent child (rows 6) and (7)).
Although in most cases the correspondence is close, the model overstates the choice of full-time
employment against part-time employment among university graduates while understating full-time
employment for lower educated woman. By family composition the match is very close.
276.2 Elasticities of labour supply
The elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage measures the sensitivity of labour supply to
small changes in incentives. It is thus an important, although insu±cient, and standard parameter to
understand and predict the e®ects of policies that alter the payo® to work. However, the concept is
ambiguous as there are many alternative measures of wage elasticity of labour supply (see Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999, or Meghir and Phillips, 2010, for extensive discussions of alternative wage elasticities
and their appropriateness for policy evaluation). First, it can be de¯ned with respect to working
hours or participation to study responses on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively (see
Saez, 2002, and Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2010). Second, it depends on whether inter-temporal
considerations are being accounted for. And third, it depends on what is being held constant. In a
static model, it is most common to hold constant utility (Hicksian elasticity) or non-labour income
(Marshallian elasticity). In inter-temporal formulations, similar concepts could be de¯ned depending
on whether within-period or life-cycle variables are kept constant. The most frequently de¯ned
intertemporal wage elasticity of labour supply holds constant the marginal utility of wealth (Frisch
elasticity), thus quantifying responses to anticipated changes in wages. This is not the most useful
concept for policy evaluation in an intertemporal framework as most interventions arrive unannounced
and may a®ect the wage pro¯les for some (possibly long and partly) predictable length of time. An
alternative intertemporal wage elasticity quanti¯es the relative responses to unexpected shifts in wage
pro¯les, adding wealth e®ects (from unanticipated wage changes) to the Frisch elasticity. Thus, it is
expected to be smaller than the Frisch elasticity if leisure is a normal good, although the di®erence
will depend on the duration of the shift and may depend on age.
We adopt the latter concept and simulate changes in behaviour in responses to a temporary (1
period only) and a permanent (for the rest of life) unexpected 1% increase in net wages. Simulated
wage elasticities of labour supply are presented in table 8. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the
transitory change during the period the wage is higher. Columns (3) to (6) show the results for the
unexpected shift in life-cycle wages, ¯rst on the period the shift occurs (columns (3) and (4)) and
then on all the life-cycle after the shift (columns (5) and (6)).
The simulated set of elasticities display some reasonable patterns. Results in columns (1) and
(2), for the transitory change in wage, are always higher than those in columns (3) and (4), for the
permanent shift, as wealth e®ects are more important for the latter. Participation is more elastic
than hours, a result that is common in the empirical literature (see the survey of participation and
hours elasticities in Meghir and Phillips, 2010). Mothers are more responsive to changes in net wages
28Table 8: Wage elasticities of labour supply: simulations of unexpected changes in wages
E®ect in period wage changes LC e®ect
transitory shift permanent shift permanent shift
participation hours participation hours participation hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single women
(1) all 0.62 0.06 0.39 0.05 0.54 0.05
(2) no children 0.47 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.42 -0.03
(3) mothers 1.04 0.31 0.69 0.25 0.93 0.38
Women in couples
(4) all 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.19 0.26 0.25
(5) no children 0.40 0.28 0.40 0.11 0.16 0.19
(6) mothers 0.71 0.70 0.57 0.36 0.47 0.40
By age when wage changes
(7) 29 or less 0.75 0.36 0.75 0.18 0.50 0.19
(8) 30 to 39 0.69 0.30 0.48 0.20 0.26 0.21
(9) 40 to 49 0.48 0.30 0.34 0.17 0.16 0.15
(10) 50 plus 0.31 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.08
(11) all 0.57 0.27 0.44 0.18 0.34 0.18
(12) low educated 0.93 0.50 0.73 0.21 0.46 0.19
Notes: All values represent the percentual change in labour supply in response to a unexpected 1% increase in net earnings.
Columns (1) to (4) contain the contemporaneous responses, in the period the change in wages occurs. Columns (1) and (2) refer to
a transitory change, only to be happening in that period; columns (3) and (4) refer to a permanent change, to be a®ecting working
individuals for the remaining of their life. In both cases, individuals are aware of the nature of the change. Columns (5) and (6)
contain the responses during the whole life after the change occurs for a permanent shift in wages. Columns (1), (3) and (5) display
participation elasticities (extensive margin) while columns (2), (4) an (6) display hours elasticities (intensive margin) where two
points are considered, 20 and 40 hours per week corresponding to part- and full-time employment.
than women with no children, another typical result in the empirical literature (see Blundell, Meghir
and Neves, 1993, or Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998). The labour supply of younger women is
more elastic than that of older, a consequence not only of changes in family composition over the life-
cycle, but also of the higher returns to work at younger ages due to human capital accumulation (see
Imai and Keane, 2004). Finally, less educated women are also much more responsive to incentives,
particularly on the intensive margin.
29There is a vast empirical literature on wage elasticities for women reaching a wide range of
results. Most of the estimates are for uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticities, relying on static
models. Most intertemporal estimates are of Frisch elasticities (one notable exception being Pista-
ferri, 2003, but with results for males only). Frisch elasticities should be larger than the simulated
elasticities in table 8 but relatively close to the values in columns (1) and (2). Estimates reported in
Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) for the wage elasticity of hours work among married women in
the UK are 0.58 and in the range of 0.8-1.22 for women with no children and mothers, respectively.
These compare with our predictions of 0.28 and 0.70 (column (2), rows (5) and (6) respectively),
lower but in reasonable proximity. Within a static framework, Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1992)
suggest a wage elasticity of hours work among lone mothers of 0.34 and Brewer et al. (2006) estimate
the participation elasticity for lone mothers to be 1.02 (both studies on UK data). Our simulations
for the more similar case of a transitory change in wages are 0.31 and 1.04 (row (3), columns (2) and
(1)), very close to the empirical results.
6.3 The impact of the WFTC reform
A few empirical studies estimate the impact of the WFTC reform in 1999 on female employment
rates. We now compare our simulated predictions to some of the more sound empirical estimates.
Table 9 displays the results.
All parameters in the table are based on data up to 2002 and represent the impact of the reform
up to 3 years after its introduction. Estimates in rows (2) and (3) are based on reduced form empirical
evaluation models. Estimates in rows (3) and (4) are based on a structural static labour supply
and programme participation model capable of separating the e®ects of WFTC from other reforms
occurring around the same time. The parameters in row (4) represent the e®ect of the WFTC alone
while the parameters in row (5) represent the combined e®ect of WFTC and other reforms occurring
up to 2002. The latter are comparable with estimates in rows (2) and (3). Simulations in row (1) are
for the 3 ¯rst years after an unexpected reform putting together the WFTC and other tax reforms
introduced in the UK between 1999 and 2002.
The simulations seem to capture the impact on lone mothers quite accurately but overstate the
response on married women, independently of whether the partner is working or not. As a result,
our predictions are of a more pronounced negative e®ect of the reform on employment participation
among women in couples.
30Table 9: The impact of WFTC reform on employment: simulated versus empirical literature results
lone married mothers
mothers all partner working partner not working
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) simulations +4.4% -2.0% -3.0% +4.1%
(2) BBS, 2005 +3.6% -0.1% +2.6%
(3) FRK, 2009 +0.7%¤ +0.1-0.6%¤ 3.1%
(4) BDSS, 2006 +5.0% -0.5%
(5) BDSS, 2006 (combined) +3.7% -0.4%
Notes: BBS, 2005 stands for Blundell, Brewer and Shephard, 2005. BDSS, 2006 stands for Brewer, Duncan, Shephard and
Suarez, 2006. FRK, 2009 stands for Francesconi, Rainer and Van Der Klaauw, 2009. Estimates in row (4) are for WFTC
alone; estimates in row (5) are the combined e®ects of WFTC and other reforms occurring up to 2002. The latter are
comparable with estimates in rows (2) and (3). Row (1) shows simulations based on the model discussed in this paper and
e®ects are for ¯rst three years after unexpected change of tax regime amounting to the reforms occurring between April
199 and April 2002.
¤ Statistical insigni¯cant estimate at standard levels.
7 Policy experiments
A rich structural labour supply model can be a very useful tool for policy evaluation. In this section
we will use our model to gain further insight on the e®ects of two major tax reforms, the 1999 Working
Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and the 2003 Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit (WTC/CTC).
We simulate the entire women's life-cycle at three moments in time, April 1999, 2002 and 2004, when
the tax credits regime were the Family Credit (FC), the WFTC and the WTC/CTC. As before, we
use initial conditions from the BHPS. The identi¯ed e®ects represent long-run, life-cycle responses. In
what follows, we start by describing how the policy regimes a®ect working incentives for some selected
cases and will then discuss the simulated e®ects on employment, income and education decisions.
7.1 The three regimes: FC, WFTC and WTC/CTC
For the purposes of this exercise, we will be comparing three tax regimes operating in the UK in
April 1999, 2002 and 2004 and representing tax credit periods under Family Credit (FC, pre October
1999), Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC, October 1999 to March 203) and the combination of
31Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit (WTC/CTC, April 2003 onwards).4 The three regimes
are very similar, the main changes having amounted to make awards more generous, available higher
up in the income distribution and to an increasing variety of families, including working families with
no children (WTC) and non-working families with children (CTC).
Previous studies have highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the impact of these reforms, de-
pending in particular on family circumstances, and the possible interaction and accumulation with
other existing taxes and bene¯ts (Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2010). In here we will pay especial
attention to Housing Bene¯t (HB), a large means-tested rental subsidy programme potentially a®ect-
ing the same families that are eligible to tax credits. HB may cover up to 100% of the cost of renting
for low income families in Income Support (IS) or Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) living in rented
accommodation. Once eligibility to IS/JSA has been exhausted, the withdrawal rate is high (65% on
net income). A similar means-tested bene¯t, the Council Tax Bene¯t (CTB), is available to those
eligible to HB and is tapered at 20%. Eligible groups for HB/CTB face strong working disincentives
that the WFTC or WTC/CTC reforms do not resolve.
To illustrate the (contemporaneous) costs of working for some groups, ¯gure 5 plots the pro¯les
of net weekly income by woman's working hours for a couple with a non-working man and one
dependent child (woman earns $4.6 per hour). Whether or not the family rents their accommodation,
the WFTC and WTC/CTC reforms signi¯cantly shift this family's budget constraint upwards, but
in the case of a positive rent the pro¯le is very °at in all regimes and has not improved over time.
The discontinuity at 16 hours in 2004 may lead some otherwise unemployed individuals to move into
part-time work but the large marginal tax rates imposed over extra earnings from then onwards will
probably inhibit any further work. On the other hand, the increased non-labour income in both
2002 and 2004 may lead some otherwise employed individuals to drop work. By comparison, the
incentives towards work of families living in non-rented accommodation have improved much more
substantially over time. Not only the subsidies became gradually more generous, particularly between
1999 and 2002, the marginal tax rate for workers above 16 hours per week has also been reduced as a
consequence of a drop in the tax credit taper rate. Given the wage elasticities discussed in subsection
6.2, positive participation and hours responses can be expected for this group. Lone parents face a
set of very similar budget constraints.
Another group strongly a®ected by the HB/CTB is that of childless couples with a non-working
man. Figure 6 illustrates this case. For couples renting accommodation the phasing out of HB and
4See section 2 and references therein for details on the tax system.
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Notes: Woman earns $4.6 per hour. Fortax simulations.
CTB removes any gains from working in 1999 or 2002 regimes. The 2004 regime extended tax credits
to families with no children, introducing some positive incentive (although small for families in rented
accommodation) for full-time work.
For other groups, the type of accommodation is irrelevant for the woman's working incentives.
Figure 7 shows such a case, for a couple with one child where the man is working full-time. Increased
generosity and enlargement of phasing out regions meant the WFTC regime reduced the gains from
working and the incentive to work more hours for this group. The incentives to work were not
as a®ected by the WTC/CTC reform, at least in what concerns to part-time work as the added
generosity of this regime meant the phasing-out of tax-credits happens higher up in the distribution
of income.
7.2 E®ects on labour supply
Table 10 shows the simulated e®ects on employment rates of the April 2002 and April 2004 tax regimes
as compared the pre-WFTC regime in April 1999 (FC). These are long-run e®ects, representing life-
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34cycle changes in labour supply. Only responses in education take-up are excluded. The parameters
in this table do not necessarily match those reported in table 9 (notably the impact of WFTC for
single mothers), which measure employment responses in the ¯rst 3 years after an unexpected change
in regime occurring at a randomly drawn age.
Table 10: The impact of the WFTC and WTC/CTC reforms on employment
Single women Women in couples
no child 1 child no child 1 child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E®ects of WFTC reform on employment rates
(1) no rented accommodation 1.1% 9.6% 0.1% -2.3%
(2) rented accommodation 0.5% 0.6% 0.1% -2.4%
(3) all 1.0% 5.0% 0.1% -2.3%
(4) all unskilled 1.2% 4.8% 0.2% -3.6%
E®ects of WFTC reform on full-time employment rates
(5) all 1.0% 0.4% 0.4% -1.4%
(6) all unskilled 1.2% 0.2% 0.6% -1.7%
E®ects of WTC/CTC reform on employment rates
(7) no rented accommodation 7.8% 9.2% 0.6% 0.0%
(8) rented accommodation 1.7% 0.0% -0.6% 0.5%
(9) all 5.8% 5.1% 0.5% 0.1%
(10) all unskilled 7.5% 4.6% 0.6% -0.4%
E®ects of WTC/CTC reform on full-time employment rates
(11) all 5.8% -2.8% -0.1% -4.5%
(12) all unskilled 7.4% -1.6% -0.2% -5.2%
Notes: All values presented and percentual point changes in employment rates (rows (1)-(4)) and
full-time employment rates (rows (5), (6), (11) and (12)). Simulations in rows (1) and (7) under the
assumption that no rent is paid by the family for their accommodation. Simulations in rows (3) and
(8) under the assumption that the family pays $60 a week in rent. Simulations in rows (3)-(6) and
(9)-(12) are weighted averages of e®ects per woman's education and type of accommodation for each
family type; weights represent the frequency of each groups in BHPS data (waves 1991-1998).
The ¯gures in table 10 show the large heterogeneity in responses to both policy scenarios as
compared to FC. Single mothers, a major target group in the WFTC reform, increase labour supply
very signi¯cantly if living in non-rented accommodation in response to the positive working incentives
35introduced with the WFTC reform (column (2), row (1)). However, the phasing out of HB drains
most of the positive incentives if women live in renting accommodation (column (2), row (2)). The
same holds true for the WTC/CTC reform (column (2), rows (7) and (8)). The responses of unskilled
women are in the same range of values as those for other education groups (column (2), rows (4) and
(10)). This happens despite their response being much stronger if living in non-rented accommodation
(almost 15% in both regimes), and is a consequence of the disproportionately high rate of families in
rented accommodation in this group.
The extension of tax credits to childless families held positive labour supply returns for single
women under WTC/CTC (column (1), rows (7) and (8)). On the other hand, the much smaller but
positive e®ects of WFTC for single childless women are the consequence of two processes (column
(1), rows (1)-(3)). First, the dynamics of human capital accumulation, leading mostly to responses in
anticipation of expected future gains, when eventually becoming a mother. And second, some reallo-
cation of working over time to compensate for expected higher working costs, again when eventually
becoming a mother, if living in rented accommodation.
Simulated WFTC responses among married women are strongly negative (column (4), rows
(1) to (3)). This result is driven by the behaviour of women in couples where the male is working,
the vast majority of cases in this category, in which case the WFTC reform reduced the gains from
a second working adult in the tax credit's phasing out region. As predicted by inspection of graph
7, the WTC/CTC reduced the negative impact of WFTC on employment rates (column (4), rows
(7)-(9)) but had a large negative e®ect of full-time work (column (4), row (11)).
Figure 8 illustrates the employment responses over the life-cycle by education and policy regime
(as compared to FC). Responses to the WTC/CTC regime are higher at most stages of the life-cycle
among low to medium educated individuals. In both graphs, there is a large variation of average
resposes over the life-cycle for this group. In particular, the lowest educated women respond little to
the increased incentives during childbearing years due to their interaction with family composition and
accommodation type. Responses to WTC/CTC are more consistently positive for medium educated
women over life, as these are less vulnerable to the disincentives of the HB phasing-out region. As
expected, higher educated women are hardly a®ected by any of the reforms.
Table 11 presents the simulated e®ects of WFTC and WTC/CTC on life-cycle employment,
income and education decisions. Life-cycle changes in labour supply are modest under the WFTC
regime (and this is also true conditional on housing type) suggesting most of the e®ects identi¯ed
earlier are reallocations of labour supply across life-cycle periods in response to di®erential changes in

























































































































Notes: Simulations keep education investment constant across policy regimes.
incentives by age (rows (1) and (2), columns (1) to (3)). WTC/CTC yields more important life-cycle
e®ects on employment in response to extended improved working incentives for larger parts of the
life-cycle (row (1), columns (4) to (6)). Most of the changes are absorbed by part-time employment
given the comparatively high payo®s to this type of work among mothers.
The small e®ects of WFTC and WTC/CTC on lifetime gross earned income (row (3)) are
consistent with the limited impact these reforms have had in total employment, particularly on a
full-time basis. On the contrary, net income has been much more importantly a®ected (row (4)),
a consequence of the strong changes in net tax liability particularly among the less educated and
re°ecting a strong shift of resources towards lower income families on a lifetime perspective. Figure
9 shows how income has changed over the life-cycle by education. Clearly, the policies are also
responsible for a strong relative shift of income towards the beginning of the life-cycle among the low
to medium educated women, when liquidity constraints are expected to be more relevant.
Row (6) of table 11 displays modest education responses. Notwithstanding, the simulations
predict the take-up of university education to be reduced by almost 1% in response to the WTC/CTC
reform. Preliminary inspection of the BHPS suggests that this result is not at odds with data on
university graduation rates but this matter needs further investigation.
37Table 11: The impact of the WFTC and WTC/CTC reforms on LC family income and education
E®ects of WFTC by education E®ects of WTC/CTC by education
basic secondary university basic secondary university
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E®ects of WFTC
(1) LC employment +0.8% +0.6% +0.3% +3.1% +3.2% +1.0%
(2) LC full-time employment +0.1% +0.0% +0.4% -0.2% +0.7% +0.3%
(3) LC gross income +0.1% 0.0% +0.1% +0.1% +0.2% 0.0%
(4) LC net income +2.5% +1.6% +1.2% +2.2% +0.9% -0.3%
(5) LC tax liability -14.1% -5.5% -2.8% -12.5% -1.9% +1.0%
(6) education +0.8% -0.3% -0.5% +1.2% -0.3% -0.9%
Notes: Values in rows (3) to (5) are percentage change in cumulated LC variables when education investments are kept unaltered
over policy regimes. Values in rows (1), (2) and (6) are percentual point change in education rates. LC stands for `life-cycle'.
Income and taxes are measured at the family level.















































































Notes: Simulations keep education investment constant across policy regimes.
388 Conclusions
This model proposes a life-cycle model of women's labour supply, human capital formation and sav-
ings for policy evaluation. Decisions are taken in an uncertain dynamic environment under credit
constraints. The model includes important features not yet considered together in the literature.
First, the dynamic process of family formation is explicitly accounted for. And second, a detailed
description of the policy environment is used to accurately determine net earnings by employment
status. The model is calibrated on a large set of data moments from the nineties under a policy
environment reproducing the April 1999 regime. Many important empirical features are closely re-
produced, including the empirically estimated short-run e®ects of the WFTC reform on employment
rates. Simulations are then used to study the impact of WFTC and WTC/CTC on women employ-
ment, family income and education decisions.
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41Appendix A: Exogenously set parameters
Tables 12 to 16 present the exogenously determined parameters. The estimation of male's employment
and earnings equations uses a parametric selection model (see Heckman, 1978 and 1979).
Table 12: Exogenously set parameters: prices and preferences
parameter
(1) Interest, R 1.015
(2) Discount factor, ¯ 0.98
(3) Curvature in utility of consumption, ¹ -0.56
(4) University fees, T $19.2 per week
(5) Hourly childcare price, to determine Ck $2.04
Notes: University fees payable for three years, parameters in row (4) thus correspond
to a total fee of $3,000 for a 3-year degree.




(1) intercept 0.174 0.032 -0.011
(2) age -0.045 -0.006 0.007
(3) age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Married women
(4) intercept -0.098 -0.412 -2.116
(5) age 0.246 0.372 1.414
(6) age squared -0.051 -0.062 -0.216
Notes: parametric speci¯cation: quadratic polynomial in age. Age is
divided by 10.
42Table 14: Exogenously set parameters: probabilities of partnering and separation
Partnering Separation
no child child all
(1) intercept 0.056 0.243 0.234
(2) age 0.025 -0.047 -0.090
(3) age squared -0.006 0.000 0.009
Notes: parametric speci¯cation: quadratic polynomial in age. Age is
divided by 10.
Table 15: Exogenously set parameters: Distribution of man's education in new couples
Man's education
basic secondary university
No child, by woman's education
(1) basic 0.58 0.39 0.03
(2) secondary 0.34 0.51 0.15
(3) university 0.10 0.34 0.55
Child, by woman's education
(4) basic 0.54 0.40 0.06
(5) secondary 0.31 0.51 0.19
(6) university 0.14 0.32 0.55





(1) new couples 0.75 0.88 0.85
(2) ongoing couples: intercept -0.94 -0.50 -0.25
(3) ongoing couples: previously employed 2.71 2.47 2.37
Log wage equation
(4) intercept 1.72 1.83 1.79
(5) log woman's age 0.05 0.12 0.25
(6) dispersion productivity (new couples) 0.40 0.40 0.40
(6) dispersion innovation in productivity (ongoing couples) 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: Parameters in rows (2) and (3) and coe±cients from probit regression on dummy for previous man's employment
status in ongoing couples.
44